The final hurdles

Formal multiparty negotiations were resumed in April 1993. The name Codesa was dropped since it was associated with failure, and was replaced by ‘Multiparty Negotiating Process’ (MPNP). The MPNP was more streamlined and, in view of the political tension prevailing, was imbued with a sense of urgency. The country was again brought to the brink of widespread violence by the assassination of popular SACP leader Chris Hani on 10 April. It took Mandela’s public appeals for calm to prevent disaster.

An important bridging of the differences between the NP and the ANC had occurred in November 1992 when the ANC accepted the need for a form of joint rule (or joint decision-making) before majority rule. Joe Slovo, leader of the SACP and one of the ANC’s leading theoreticians, devised the strategic repositioning. He recommended a ‘sunset’ clause whereby a government of national unity, comprising the major parties, would govern for a five-year period, with the proviso that parties that had lost the election would not be able to paralyse the government. Slovo also drew attention to the ‘vast potential’ of the bureaucracy and security forces to destabilise a fledgling democracy unless guarantees of job security or retrenchment packages were offered.

The NP was still holding out for permanent multiparty government, but the ANC’s concession went some way to meeting its demand. Roelf Meyer, the Minister of Constitutional Development and the government’s chief negotiator, acknowledged subsequently that the government of national unity (GNU) concept was not a coalition ‘but a forced agreement of co-operation between opponents and not between two parties who have found common ground’. The GNU proposal was to be temporary, which some of Meyer’s colleagues opposed, wanting it to be permanent. With De Klerk’s backing, Meyer’s view prevailed.

Although the principle of a GNU was accepted, agreement on how it should take decisions proved elusive. The NP wanted two-thirds support for cabinet decisions, which the ANC rejected. It was not until November 1993 that agreement was reached when the NP abandoned its demand. De Klerk recognised that an impossible situation would be created if the cabinet had to vote on every decision: ‘If the minority parties consistently thwarted the will of the majority it might in the end impose intolerable strain on the whole constitutional edifice.’

It was agreed that every party winning at least 80 seats (out of 400) would be entitled to a deputy presidency and every party winning at least 20 seats would be entitled to cabinet seats proportionate to the number of seats held by it in the National Assembly.

Slowly and painfully the ANC and the NP edged closer together. Initially, while the NP wanted maximum decentralisation of government, the ANC wanted a strong central government. In the end the ANC accepted regional governments whose powers the central government could not remove. This should have cleared the way for an IFP return to negotiations, but Buthelezi still demanded a form of confederation and rejected the principle of an elected constitution-making body. He feared that a victorious ANC would destroy the scaffolding of his power-base in KwaZulu, namely the traditional leaders.

The assassination of Chris Hani enabled the ANC to exert fierce pressure on government to fix a date for the election. On 2 July 1993 the MPNP agreed to 27 April 1994 as the date. The deadline meant that many outstanding concerns needed to be resolved speedily since the interim constitution had to be enacted into law by Parliament before the end of 1993. The parties had to agree on three main matters: constitutional principles to be incorporated in the final constitution, the demarcation of regions (later called provinces) and the legislation for ‘levelling the playing field’ before the election.

The constitutional principles on which further agreement was reached were the following: a constitutional democracy free of discrimination, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, a public service that was to be non-partisan and broadly representative of the public, and equality before the law, making allowance for affirmative action. 

To appease the seemingly intransigent white right wing, Constitutional Principle number 34 was added. It acknowledged the right of a cultural community to self-determination, provided there was substantial proven support for this within the community concerned. General Viljoen and the Freedom Front were now drawn into participating in the election by an ANC promise that the new government would appoint a council of his followers to consider the prospect of an Afrikaner volkstaat.

At a late stage Buthelezi and the IFP agreed to participate in the election after assurances were given about the constitutional position of the Zulu monarchy. A promise was also made that outstanding constitutional problems would be resolved later through international mediation. The independent ‘homelands’ of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda had little option but to be reintegrated into South Africa. Transkei and Venda, whose military dictators supported the ANC, agreed willingly. Bophuthatswana and Ciskei were still reluctant, but – faced with popular unrest and pressure from the South African government – were forced to acquiesce.

Significant legislation drafted by the MPNP and passed into law by Parliament created institutions designed to level the playing field in the runup to the election:

• The Transitional Executive Council came into operation in January 1994. It was a multiparty body with a wide brief to facilitate the transition to democratic government at all levels of government.

• The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) chaired by Judge Johann Kriegler was required to ensure that the election was free and fair, to determine the result, to adjudicate disputes, and to supervise the conduct of parties during the campaign.

• The Independent Media Commission’s task was to contribute to a climate that was conducive to free and fair elections and, particularly, to ensure that state information services and the South African Broadcasting Corporation were impartial in their treatment of the parties.

Struggle Twins - Chris Hani & Thabo Mbeki